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Abstract. Double block length hashing covers the idea of constructing a compression function
on 2n bits using an n-bit block cipher. In this work, we present a comprehensive indifferentiabil-
ity analysis of all relevant double length compression functions. Indifferentiability is a stronger
security notion than collision and preimage resistance and ensures that a design has no structural
flaws. It is very well suited for composition: using an indifferentiable compression function in a
proper mode of operation supplies an indifferentiable hash function. Yet, as we demonstrate com-
pression function indifferentiability is not at all a triviality: almost all double length compression
functions, including Tandem-DM and Jetchev et al.’s, appear to be differentiable from a random
function in 2 queries. Nevertheless, we also prove that two known functions are indifferentiable:
the MDC-4 compression function (up to 2n/4 queries tight) and Mennink’s function (up to 2n/2
queries tight).
Keywords. double block length; block cipher based; compression function; indifferentiability.
1 Introduction
Double (block) length hashing is a well-established method for constructing a compression
function with 2n-bit output based only on n-bit block ciphers. The idea dates back to the de-
signs of MDC-2 and MDC-4 in 1988 by Meyer and Schilling [22]. Double length hash functions
have an obvious advantage over classical block cipher based functions such as Davies-Meyer
and Matyas-Meyer-Oseas, and more generally the PGV class of functions [25, 28]: the same
type of underlying primitive allows for a larger compression function. Yet, for double length
compression functions it is harder to achieve optimal n-bit collision and 2n-bit preimage secu-
rity.
We focus on the simplest type of double length compression functions, namely those that
compress 3n to 2n bits. Adopting the convention of Mennink [20], we divide the state of the
art into two classes: DBL2n, consisting of all functions that internally evaluate a 2n-bit keyed
block cipher E : {0, 1}2n ×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, and DBLn, of functions based on an n-bit keyed
block cipher E : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. A classification on the collision and preimage
security of the known functions is given in Table 1 (this classification is accredited to [20]).
Regarding these security properties, DBL2n is well-understood. For instance, the most notable
Tandem-DM and Abreast-DM [11] and Hirose’s function [7], that all make two underlying block
cipher calls, are proven optimally secure with respect to both security notions. Hirose [6] and
O¨zen and Stam [24] presented generalizations of these compression function designs (but for
convenience all of these results are handled separately in this work). Stam introduced a single-
call compression function [27, 28] (reconsidered in [16]) which is proven optimally collision
secure. Lucks [17] introduced a compression function that allows for collisions in about 2n/2
queries—and is therefore not included in the classification—but achieves optimal collision
resistance in the iteration. On the other hand, in the DBLn class the first provably optimally
collision secure function was presented only recently by Mennink [20]: his function is proven
collision secure up to 2n queries and preimage secure up to 23n/2 queries. Earlier designs in this
class are the MDC-2 and MDC-4 compression functions [22] and MJH [13], which are merely
constructed to achieve security in the iteration,1 and Jetchev et al.’s construction (which we
1 In the iteration, collision resistance is proven up to 23n/5 for MDC-2 [29] and 22n/3 for MJH [13].
will call JOS) [9], a clever design achieving collision security up to 22n/3 queries (with preimage
security guaranteed up to 2n queries).
Table 1. Asymptotic ideal cipher model security guarantees of known functions in the classes
DBL2n (first) and DBLn (second). The collision and preimage results are taken from [20]; all
indifferentiability results (in bold) are derived in this paper.
compression
E-calls
collision preimage indifferen- underlying
function security security tiability cipher
Stam’s 1 2n [28] 2n [28] 2 (Sect. 3)
Tandem-DM 2 2n [14] 22n [2, 15] 2 (Sect. 3)
Abreast-DM 2 2n [5, 12] 22n [2, 15] 2 (Sect. 3)
Hirose’s 2 2n [7] 22n [2, 15] 2 (Sect. 3)
Hirose-class 2 2n [6] 2n [6] 2 (Sect. 3)
O¨zen-Stam-class 2 2n [24] 2n [24] 2 (Sect. 4)
MDC-2 2 2n/2 2n 2 (Sect. 5)
MJH 2 2n/2 2n 2 (Sect. 5)
JOS 2 22n/3 [9] 2n [9] 2 (Sect. 6)
Mennink’s 3 2n [20] 23n/2 [20] 2n/2 (Sect. 7)
MDC-4 4 25n/8 [21] 25n/4 [21] 2n/4 (Sect. 8)
So far, these results only concern the collision and preimage security of the compression func-
tions. If such compression function is used in a proper iteration, these carry over to the hash
function design [1]. Beyond these notions, the indifferentiability framework of Maurer et al. [18]
has gained recent attention. Indifferentiability is an important security criterion as it guaran-
tees that a construction based on an underlying idealized primitive shows no structural flaws:
generic attacks on such a design are impossible up to the proven bound, and weaknesses, if any,
come from the underlying primitive. It is well suited for composition: a hash function indiffer-
entiability result (based on an underlying compression function) and a compression function
indifferentiability result (based on, say, a block cipher) compose to security of the hash func-
tion based on the ideality of the block cipher. Several hash function indifferentiability results
exist [3,4,8] and compression functions are usually easier to analyze than hash functions, and
therefore it is of interest to study the indifferentiability of compression functions.
But, returning to block cipher based compression functions, the state of affairs is entirely
topsy-turvy when it comes to indifferentiability. First of all, as for single block length compres-
sion functions, the PGV functions are known to be differentiable from random functions [10].
As a first contribution of this work, we show that this problematic situation also applies to
double length functions: all functions in the DBL2n class, as well as MDC-2, MJH, and JOS
(in the DBLn class), are trivially differentiable from a random function in 2 queries. The at-
tacks show similarities with the differentiability attacks on the PGV functions. In general,
indifferentiability appears to be much harder to achieve then “simply” collision and preimage
security.
However, on the positive side, we derive non-trivial indifferentiability results for Mennink’s
and the MDC-4 compression function. Starting with Mennink’s compression function class,
called F 3A (see Fig. 2). These functions make three block ciphers calls and are indexed by
a 4 × 4 matrix A that is required to comply with certain simple conditions. We prove that
any F 3A meeting these conditions is indifferentiable from a random function in about 2
n/2
queries (tight). This bound is worse than the collision and preimage bounds, but this is as
expected, given the negative indifferentiability results so far. The proof crucially relies on two
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key characteristics of F 3A: that any two block cipher evaluations of F
3
A define the inputs to the
third one, but more importantly, that at least two such calls are needed to learn something
about an F 3A evaluation. In general, the proof is made possible by the sequential block cipher
evaluation of the design.
Next, for the MDC-4 compression function (see Fig. 5) based on two distinct block ciphers,
we prove it indifferentiable from a random function up to 2n/4 queries (tight).2 The proof is
very similar to the one of Mennink’s function, and in particular also crucially relies on the
sequential block cipher evaluation.
All indifferentiability results are summarized in Table 1, in which we also mention the
corresponding section of this paper. The work is concluded in Sect. 9.
2 Indifferentiability
The indifferentiability framework, introduced by Maurer et al. [18], is a security notion that
formally captures the “distance” between a cryptographic construction and its random equiva-
lent. Informally, it gives a sufficient condition under which an ideal primitive R can be replaced
by some construction CP using an ideal subcomponent P. In this paper, we employ the adap-
tion and simplification by Coron et al. [4]. Recent results by Ristenpart et al. [26] show that
indifferentiability does not capture all properties of a random oracle, it applies to single stage
games only. Nevertheless, this notion captures pretty many games and remains the best way
to prove that a hash or compression function behaves like a random oracle.
Definition 1. Let C be a cryptographic primitive with oracle access to an ideal primitive P.
Let R be an ideal primitive with the same domain and range as C. Let S be a simulator with
the same domain and range as P with oracle access to R and making at most qS queries, and
let D be a distinguisher making at most qD queries. The differentiability advantage of D is
defined as
adviffC,S(D) =
∣∣Pr (DC,P = 1)−Pr (DR,S = 1)∣∣ .
We refer to (C,P) as the real world, and to (R,S) as the simulated world. We denote D’s left
oracle (C or R) by L and its right oracle (P or S) by R.
For k, n ≥ 1, we denote by Bloc(k, n) the set of all block ciphers with a k-bit key and n-
bit message space. We simply write Bloc(n) if k = n. Throughout, C : {0, 1}3n → {0, 1}2n
corresponds to a compression function design, and P represents block ciphers from Bloc(k, n)
(where k = 2n for functions in DBL2n and k = n for functions in DBLn). We stress that some
of the designs analyzed in this work are defined to make use of two distinct block ciphers (e.g.,
one call to a cipher E1 and one call to E2). Except for our indifferentiability result on MDC-4,
for all of our results it is not relevant whether the underlying ciphers are distinct or the same.
Therefore, we consider all designs simply to be based on one single block cipher, unless stated
otherwise.
3 Stam’s, Tandem-DM, Abreast-DM, Hirose’s, and Hirose-class
In this section, we consider Tandem-DM and Abreast-DM [11] (cf. Fig. 1), Hirose’s compression
function [7] (cf. Fig. 1) and its generalized Hirose-class [6],3 as well as Stam’s supercharged
2 The MDC-4 compression function based on one single block cipher is differentiable in 2 queries.
3 Hirose’s function can be seen as a special case of Hirose-class (using that in the attack it is not relevant
whether the underlying block ciphers are distinct or the same), and our attack directly carries over.
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Fig. 1. Tandem-DM (left), Abreast-DM (middle), and Hirose’s compression function (right)
[7, 11]. All wires carry n bits. For Abreast-DM, the circle ◦ denotes bit complementation. For
Hirose’s function, const is any non-zero constant.
single call Type-I compression function design [27, 28], or more specifically the block cipher
based variant considered in [16]:
Stam(u, v, w) = (y, z), where:
c1 ← E(v‖w, u) ,
y ← c1 + u ,
z ← wy2 + vy + u .
Here, additions and finite field multiplications are done over the field GF (2n). The differen-
tiability attacks are identical for all designs, and we only consider Tandem-DM (abbreviated
to TDM). The attack is a direct generalization of the fixed-point attack on the Davies-Meyer
(DM) compression function.
We note that O¨zen and Stam presented a generalized double length design [24], and our
attack on their class (in Sect. 4) can be seen as a true generalization of the attacks in this
section on Abreast-DM and Hirose’s functions (given that in these attacks it is not relevant
whether the underlying block ciphers are distinct or the same). Nevertheless, these functions
are handled separately for clarity and as an illustration.
Proposition 1. Let E
$← Bloc(2n, n), and let R : {0, 1}3n → {0, 1}2n be a random com-
pression function. For any simulator S that makes at most qS queries to R, there exists a
distinguisher D that makes 2 queries to its oracles, such that
adviffTDM,S(D) ≥ 1−
qS + 1
2n
.
Proof. Our distinguisher D aims at finding an evaluation of TDM that satisfies:
TDM(u, v, w) = (u, z) , (1)
for some values u, v, w, z. D operates as follows. First, it fixes some values v, w, and queries
u← R−1(v‖w, 0). Next, it queries its left oracle L on input of (u, v, w), and outputs 0 if and only
if the first half of the response equals u (hence if (1) is satisfied). Clearly, in the real world, (1)
holds with certainty, and D succeeds except if S or D obtains a solution to R(u, v, w) = (u, z).
As R is a random function, any query satisfies this equation with probability 12n , and R is
consulted at most qS + 1 times. This completes the proof. uunionsq
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4 O¨zen-Stam-class
O¨zen and Stam [24] analyzed a wide class of double length compression functions, extending
the single-length compression function result of Stam [28].
OS(u, v, w) = (y, z), where:
(k1,m1)← Cpre1 (u, v, w) ,
c1 ← E(k1,m1) ,
(k2,m2)← Cpre2 (u, v, w) ,
c2 ← E(k2,m2) ,
(y, z)← Cpost(u, v, w, c1, c2) .
Here, it is required that Cpre1 and C
pre
2 are bijections, as is C
post(u, v, w, ·, ·) for fixed (u, v, w).
Additionally, certain requirements are posed on Caux1 and C
aux
2 (combinations of the three
functions), but these are not relevant for our analysis.
We assume the existence of a bijection M : {0, 1}2n → {0, 1}2n such that the left half of
M ◦ Cpost(u, v, w, c1, c2) is independent of c2, and consider the compression function design
with M appended. (Note that this does not affect the security result.) For convenience, we
simply assume the existence of Cpost1 and C
post
2 such that
y ← Cpost1 (u, v, w, c1) ,
z ← Cpost2 (u, v, w, c1, c2) .
Proposition 2. Let E
$← Bloc(2n, n), and let R : {0, 1}3n → {0, 1}2n be a random com-
pression function. For any simulator S that makes at most qS queries to R, there exists a
distinguisher D that makes 2 queries to its oracles, such that
adviffOS,S(D) ≥ 1−
qS + 1
2n
.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Prop. 1, and we only highlight the differences. Our
distinguisher D aims at finding an evaluation of OS that satisfies:
OS(u, v, w) = (Cpost1 (u, v, w, 0), z) , (2)
for some values u, v, w, z. First, the adversary fixes k1, and queries m1 ← R−1(k1, 0). Then, it
computes (u, v, w)← C−pre1 (k1,m1). Next, it queries its left oracle L on input of (u, v, w), and
outputs 0 if and only if (2) is satisfied. The remainder of the analysis is the same as in the
proof of Prop. 1. uunionsq
5 MDC-2 and MJH
In this section, we consider the MDC-2 and MJH compression functions. For MDC-2, we leave
out the swapping at the end as it is of no influence to the indifferentiability proof. The functions
are defined as follows (for MJH, σ is an involution and θ a constant):
MDC-2(u, v, w) = (y, z), where: MJH(u, v, w) = (y, z), where:
c1 ← E(u,w) , c1 ← E(v, u+ w) ,
y ← c1 + w , y ← c1 + u+ w ,
c2 ← E(v, w) , c2 ← E(v, σ(u+ w)) ,
z ← c2 + w . z ← (c2 + σ(u+ w)) · θ + u .
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Recall that for our results, it is not relevant whether the underlying ciphers are distinct or the
same.
Proposition 3. Let E
$← Bloc(n), and let R : {0, 1}3n → {0, 1}2n be a random compression
function. For any simulator S that makes at most qS queries to R, there exists a distinguisher
D that makes 2 queries to its oracles, such that
adviffMDC-2,S(D) ≥ 1−
qS + 1
2n
.
The same result holds for MJH.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Prop. 1. Now, our distinguisher aims at finding
an evaluation of MDC-2 that satisfies MDC-2(u, v, w) = (w, z), and the same for MJH. The
remainder of the analysis is almost identical to the proof of Prop. 1, and therefore omitted. uunionsq
6 JOS
In this section, we consider Jetchev et al.’s compression function (called JOS). The analysis is
slightly more complicated but in fact not much different. We consider the block cipher based
variant with the underlying matrix A as suggested in [23, Sect. 5.4.2].
JOS(u, v, w) = (y, z), where:
c1 ← E(w, u) ,
c2 ← E(w + uv, v) ,
y ← u+ v + (u+ c1)(v + c2) ,
z ← u+ v + c1 + c2 .
Here, additions and finite field multiplications are done over the field GF (2n).
Proposition 4. Let E
$← Bloc(n), and let R : {0, 1}3n → {0, 1}2n be a random compression
function. For any simulator S that makes at most qS queries to R, there exists a distinguisher
D that makes 2 queries to its oracles, such that
adviffJOS,S(D) ≥ 1−
qS + 1
2n
.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Prop. 1. Now, our distinguisher aims at finding an
evaluation of JOS(u, v, w) = (y, z) that satisfies y + uz = u2 + u + v. The remainder of the
analysis is almost identical to the proof of Prop. 1, and therefore omitted. uunionsq
7 Mennink’s
Mennink’s double length compression function design, dubbed F 3A : {0, 1}3n → {0, 1}2n (de-
picted in Fig. 2), makes three calls to a single block cipher, and is indexed by a 4× 4 matrix
A =

a1
a2
a3
a4
 =

a11 a12 a13 0
a21 a22 a23 a24
a31 a32 a33 0
a41 a42 a43 a44
 (3)
over the field GF (2n).4
4 Bit strings from {0, 1}n and finite field elements in GF (2n) are identified to define addition and scalar
multiplication over {0, 1}n. For two tuples x = (x1, . . . , xl) and y = (y1, . . . , yl) of elements from {0, 1}n, x·y
denotes inner product
∑l
i=1 xiyi ∈ {0, 1}n.
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1 FA = colQ-left
u v w
c1
A
a1·(u, v, c1)
a2·(u, v, c1, w)
a3·(u, v, c1)
a4·(u, v, c1, w)
y z
F 3A(u, v, w) = (y, z), where:
c1 ← E(u, v) ,
k2 ← a1 ·(u, v, c1) ,
m2 ← a2 ·(u, v, c1, w) ,
y ← E(k2,m2) +m2 ,
k3 ← a3 ·(u, v, c1) ,
m3 ← a4 ·(u, v, c1, w) ,
z ← E(k3,m3) +m3 .
Fig. 2. Mennink’s compression function class F 3A where A is a 4× 4 matrix as in (3).
The security of F 3A is based on the key principle that any two block cipher evaluations
define the input to the third one. Indeed, invertibility of A guarantees that evaluations of the
second and third block cipher define the values (u, v, c1). Also, if a24 6= 0 (resp. a44 6= 0),
the first and second (resp. third) block cipher define the inputs to the third (resp. second)
one. However, in order to achieve collision and preimage security, Mennink posed a slightly
larger set of conditions on A, which he called colreq (for collision security) and prereq
(for preimage security). For the indifferentiability results, it suffices to pose a much weaker
condition on A. In detail, we require the following from A (called indreq): A is invertible and
a12, a13, a24, a32, a33, a44 6= 0. As prereq ⇒ colreq ⇒ indreq, our results particularly apply
to all schemes proven secure in [20].
Suiting the analysis, we define a function getw that, on input of j ∈ {2, 4}, m ∈ {0, 1}n,
and (k1,m1, c1) ∈ {0, 1}3n, outputs w such that aj ·(k1,m1, c1, w) = m. Note that a24, a44 6= 0
implies uniqueness of w. Differentiability is discussed in Sect. 7.1, and indifferentiability in
Sect. 7.2.
7.1 Differentiability
In Prop. 5 we show that F 3A is differentiable from a random oracle in at most about 2
n/2
queries.
Proposition 5. Let E
$← Bloc(n), and let R : {0, 1}3n → {0, 1}2n be a random compression
function. For any simulator S that makes at most qS queries to R, there exists a distinguisher
D that makes 2n/2 + 2 queries to its oracles, such that
adviffF 3A ,S(D) ≥
1
2
− 1
2n/2+1
− qS + 1
2n − qS .
Proof. Our distinguisher D aims at finding two different evaluations of F 3A with the same key
inputs to the second (or third) block cipher call. In more detail, the distinguisher aims at
finding two distinct block cipher calls (k1,m1, c1) and (k
′
1,m
′
1, c
′
1) such that for j ∈ {1, 3}:
aj ·(k1,m1, c1) = aj ·(k′1,m′1, c′1) . (4)
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Note that in the real world, for F 3A, such collisions are expected to be found in about 2
n/2
queries to E (here we use that a12, a13, a32, a33 6= 0). If the distinguisher eventually finds a
collision as in (4), then for any m ∈ {0, 1}n, the following condition naturally holds in the real
world:
y = y′ if j = 1 and z = z′ if j = 3 , (5)
where
(y, z) = F 3A(k1,m1, getw(j + 1,m, k1,m1, c1)) ,
(y′, z′) = F 3A(k
′
1,m
′
1, getw(j + 1,m, k
′
1,m
′
1, c
′
1)) .
In the random world, with F 3A replaced by R, this equation only holds with small probability.
Note that the simulator never learns the value m, yet, it may simply try to avoid collisions as in
(4). However, in this case, the responses from S are too biased, which allows the distinguisher
to succeed.
Formally, the distinguisher D proceeds as follows.
(i) D makes 2n/2 queries to its right oracle R for different key and different message values,
obtaining 2n/2 distinct tuples (k1,m1, c1);
(ii) If there is no solution to (4), D returns 1;
(iii) Let j ∈ {1, 3} and (k1,m1, c1) and (k′1,m′1, c′1) be such that (4) is satisfied;
(iv) Take m
$← {0, 1}n. If (5) holds, D returns 0, and otherwise it returns 1.
Distinguisher D succeeds except in the following two cases: “C1” it is conversing with the real
world and (4) does not have a solution (which means that his guess in step (ii) is wrong),
or “C2” it is conversing with the simulated world and (5) holds (which means that his guess
in step (iv) is wrong). Therefore, adviffF 3A ,S(D) ≥ 1 − Pr (C1) − Pr (C2). Regarding C1: note
that all queries are made with different key inputs, and E is a random cipher. Therefore, all
responses are randomly drawn from a set of size 2n, and a collision (4) occurs with probability
at least
(
2n/2
2
)
1
2n (as a12, a13, a32, a33 6= 0). Thus,
Pr (C1) ≤ 1−
(
2n/2
2
)
1
2n
=
1
2
+
1
2n/2+1
.
Regarding C2, denote by E the event that S ever queries R(k1,m1, getw(j + 1,m, k1,m1, c1)).
Then,
Pr (C2) ≤ Pr (C2 | ¬E) + Pr (E) ≤ 1
2n − qS +
qS
2n − (qS − 1) =
qS + 1
2n − qS ,
where we use that a24, a44 6= 0. This completes the proof. uunionsq
7.2 Indifferentiability
We prove that F 3A is indifferentiable from a random function.
Theorem 1. Let E
$← Bloc(n), and let R : {0, 1}3n → {0, 1}2n be a random function. There
exists a simulator S such that for any distinguisher D that makes at most qL left queries and
qR right queries,
adviffF 3A ,S(D) ≤
7(3qL + qR)
2
2n
,
where S makes qS ≤ qR queries to R.
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The simulator S used in the proof mimics the behavior of random cipher E such that queries
to S and queries to R are consistent, which means that relations among the query outputs in
the real world hold in the simulated world as well. In the remainder of the section, we first
introduce our simulator and accommodate it with an intuition, and next present the formal
proof.
Simulator Intuition
For k ∈ {0, 1}n, the simulator maintains an initially empty list LE[k]. In this list, it stores
tuples (m, c) such that S(k,m) = c. We write LE+[k] for all input values m and LE−[k] for
all output values c. Sometimes, we abuse notation and write (k,m, c) ∈ LE to denote that
(m, c) ∈ LE[k].
Mennink’s F 3A class of functions is based on the key principle that any two block ciphers
define the inputs to the third one. The simulator we use for the proof of Thm. 1 enormously
benefits from some of these characteristics. In more detail, the simulator is given in Fig. 3.
Apart from the if -clause of lines 02-06, the simulator identically mimics an ideal cipher.
In this particular clause, the simulator checks whether a query (k,m) may appear in an F 3A
evaluation (see Fig. 2) as a bottom query (left or right) for some other query appearing in
the top. In more detail, this happens if (k,m) = (aj ·(k1,m1, c1), aj+1 ·(k1,m1, c1, w)) for some
j ∈ {1, 3} and some earlier query (k1,m1, c1) ∈ LE. In this case, the simulator should consult
R to derive the query response. At a higher level, the simulator is based on the idea that, with
high probability, a distinguisher can only compare (F 3A, E) and (R,S) if it makes the queries
to E/S “in correct order”: for any evaluation of F 3A that can be derived from LE, the top
query is made prior to the two bottom queries.
Forward Query S(k,m)
00 if LE+[k](m) 6= ⊥ return c = LE+[k](m)
01 c
$← {0, 1}n\LE+[k]
02 if ∃ j ∈ {1, 3}, (k1,m1, c1) ∈ LE : k = aj ·(k1,m1, c1)
03 w ← getw(j + 1,m, k1,m1, c1)
04 (y, z)←R(k1,m1, w)
05 c← m + (y[j = 1] + z[j = 3])
06 end if
07 return LE+[k](m)← c
Inverse Query S−1(k, c)
10 if LE−[k](c) 6= ⊥ return m = LE−[k](c)
11 m
$← {0, 1}n\LE−[k]
12 return LE−[k](c)← m
Fig. 3. The simulator S for E used in the proof of Thm. 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
We formally proof Thm. 1. Let S be the simulator of Fig. 3, and let D be any distinguisher
that makes at most qL left queries and qR right queries. Note that S makes qS ≤ qR queries.
By Def. 1, the goal is to bound:
adviffF 3A ,S(D) =
∣∣∣Pr(DF 3A ,E = 1)−Pr (DR,S = 1)∣∣∣ . (6)
As a first step, we apply a PRP-PRF switch to both worlds. More formally, we define E˜ as E
with the difference that all responses are randomly drawn from {0, 1}n. Similarly, S˜ is defined
as S of Fig. 3 with the difference that random sampling from {0, 1}n is done in lines 01 and
11. Now, ∣∣∣Pr(DF 3A ,E = 1)−Pr(DF 3A ,E˜ = 1)∣∣∣ ≤ (3qL + qR)2
2n+1
,
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and ∣∣∣Pr(DR,S˜ = 1)−Pr (DR,S = 1)∣∣∣ ≤ q2R
2n+1
,
and we obtain for (6):5
adviffF 3A ,S(D) ≤
∣∣∣Pr(DF 3A ,E˜ = 1)−Pr(DR,S˜ = 1)∣∣∣+ (3qL + qR)2
2n
. (7)
It remains to analyze the probability of D to distinguish (F 3A, E˜) from (R, S˜). Abusing notation,
we remain calling these worlds the real and simulated world. These worlds are described in
Fig. 4. Here, in both worlds, LE represents an initially empty list of all right oracle queries,
and in the simulated world only we furthermore use LR as an initially empty list of all left
oracle queries.
Let event cond(LE) be defined as follows:
cond(LE) =
 ∃ j, j
′ ∈ {1, 3}, (k,m, c), (k′,m′, c′) ∈ LE :
(k,m, c) newer than (k′,m′, c′) and
aj ·(k,m, c) ∈ {k, k′, aj′ ·(k′,m′, c′)}
 . (8)
Event cond(LE) covers the case of two distinct top queries that result to the same key input
to two bottom queries, as well as the case of a top query accidentally hitting the key k′ of a
bottom query (which may be the equal to the top query). Particularly, as long as ¬cond(LE),
the condition in line 42 of Fig. 4 is always satisfied by at most one (j, (k1,m1, c1)). In the
remainder, we prove in Lem. 1 that (F 3A, E˜) and (R, S˜) are perfectly indistinguishable as long
as cond(LE) does not occur in both worlds. Then, in Lem. 2 we prove that cond(LE) occurs in
the real world with probability at most 3(3qL+qR)
2
2n and in the simulated world with probability
at most
3q2R
2n . Together with (7), this completes the proof.
Query F 3A (u, v, w)
00 c1 ← E˜(u, v)
01 k2 ← a1 ·(u, v, c1)
02 m2 ← a2 ·(u, v, c1, w)
03 y ← E˜(k2,m2) + m2
04 k3 ← a3 ·(u, v, c1)
05 m3 ← a4 ·(u, v, c1, w)
06 z ← E˜(k3,m3) + m3
07 return (y, z)
Query E˜(k,m)
10 if LE+[k](m) 6= ⊥ return c = LE+[k](m)
11 c
$← {0, 1}n
12 return LE+[k](m)← c
Query E˜−1(k, c)
20 if LE−[k](c) 6= ⊥ return m = LE−[k](c)
21 m
$← {0, 1}n
22 return LE−[k](c)← m
Query R(u, v, w)
30 if LR(u, v, w) 6= ⊥ return (y, z) = LR(u, v, w)
31 (y, z)
$← {0, 1}2n
32 return LR(u, v, w)← (y, z)
Query S˜(k,m)
40 if LE+[k](m) 6= ⊥ return c = LE+[k](m)
41 c
$← {0, 1}n
42 if ∃ j ∈ {1, 3}, (k1,m1, c1) ∈ LE : k = aj ·(k1,m1, c1)
43 w ← getw(j + 1,m, k1,m1, c1)
44 (y, z)←R(k1,m1, w)
45 c← m + (y[j = 1] + z[j = 3])
46 end if
47 return LE+[k](m)← c
Query S˜−1(k, c)
50 if LE−[k](c) 6= ⊥ return m = LE−[k](c)
51 m
$← {0, 1}n
52 return LE−[k](c)← m
Fig. 4. The worlds (F 3A, E˜) (left) and (R, S˜) (right).
5 Technically, we could have taken S˜ as our simulator, therewith obtaining an improved indifferentiability
bound for Thm. 1. However, for clarity and ease of presentation, we opted for simulator S.
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Lemma 1. As long as ¬cond(LE), (F 3A, E˜) from (R, S˜) are perfectly indistinguishable.
Proof. We consider any query made by the distinguisher, either to the left oracle L (either
F 3A or R) and the right oracle R/R−1 (either E˜/E˜−1 or S˜/S˜−1), and show that the query
responses are equally distributed in both worlds (irrespectively of the query history). Without
loss of generality, we consider new queries only: if the distinguisher makes a repetitive query,
the answer is known and identically distributed in both worlds.
L-query (u, v, w). We make the following distinction:
1. LE+[u](v) = ⊥. In the real world, this means that the first cipher call E˜(u, v) is new,
and answered with a fresh value. As cond(LE) does not occur, also the second and third
call, E˜(k2,m2) and E˜(k3,m3), are fresh, and both their responses are drawn from {0, 1}n.
Regarding the simulated world, by the condition “LE+[u](v) = ⊥,” S˜ has never queried R
on input of (u, v, w). Indeed, it had only queried R if the condition of line 42 was satisfied
for some j ∈ {1, 3} and existing (u, v, c1) ∈ LE. Thus, also in this world the response is
randomly generated from {0, 1}2n;
2. LE+[u](v) 6= ⊥. Note that in the real world, this element could have been added to LE
via D or via F 3A. Let c1 = LE+[u](v), and write (k2,m2) = (a1 ·(u, v, c1), a2 ·(u, v, c1, w))
and (k3,m3) = (a3 ·(u, v, c1), a4 ·(u, v, c1, w)). We make the following distinction:
• LE+[k2](m2) = ⊥ and LE+[k3](m3) = ⊥. In the real world, the answers to the queries
E˜(k2,m2) and E˜(k3,m3) are both fresh and randomly drawn from {0, 1}n. Regarding
the simulated world, by contradiction we prove that R(u, v, w) has never been queried
before by S˜. Indeed, suppose it has been queried before. This necessarily means that
there exist j ∈ {1, 3} and (u, v, c1) ∈ LE such that aj ·(u, v, c1) = k′ and w = getw(j +
1,m′, u, v, c1) for some (k′,m′, c′) ∈ LE. The former implies k′ = k2[j = 1] + k3[j = 3],
and the latter implies m′ = aj+1 ·(u, v, c1, w) and thus m′ = m2[j = 1] + m3[j = 3].
This contradicts the condition that (k2,m2) and (k3,m3) are not in LE. Therefore, the
query (u, v, w) to R is new, and the response is randomly drawn from {0, 1}2n;
• LE+[k2](m2) 6= ⊥ and/or LE+[k3](m3) 6= ⊥. Without loss of generality, assume the
former and write c2 = LE+[k2](m2). In the real world, this query could not have been
made in an earlier evaluation of F 3A (by virtue of cond(LE)). Therefore, the distinguisher
must have made this query, and particular knows y = c2 +m2, which is the left half of
the query response. In the simulated world, a similar story applies: by ¬cond(LE), this
query to S˜ must have been made after (u, v, c1), and thus, the response value c2 equals
m+ y by line 45, where y equals the left half of R(u, v, w). Thus also in this case, the
distinguisher knows the left half of the query response.
If also LE+[k3](m3) 6= ⊥, the same reasoning applies to z, the second half of the query
response. On the other hand, in case LE+[k3](m3) = ⊥, the previous bullet carries over
to the z-part.
R-query (k,m). We make the following distinction:
1. ¬ ∃ j ∈ {1, 3}, (k1,m1, c1) ∈ LE : k = aj ·(k1,m1, c1). In the simulated world, the response
is randomly drawn from {0, 1}n by construction. Regarding the real world, first assume
(k,m) has never been queried to E˜ via a query to F 3A. Then, the response is clearly fresh
and randomly drawn from {0, 1}n. However, it may be the case that the E˜-query could have
been triggered by an earlier F 3A-query. However, by the condition, it could have impossibly
appeared in such evaluation as a bottom left/right query. It may have appeared as a top
query in an F 3A evaluation, which means that (k,m,w) has been queried to F
3
A for some
w. However, in this setting, the adversary never learnt c1, and thus the response to the
R-query appears completely randomly drawn from {0, 1}n;
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2. ∃ j ∈ {1, 3}, (k1,m1, c1) ∈ LE : k = aj·(k1,m1, c1). By ¬cond(LE), these values are unique.
Let w = getw(j+1,m, k1,m1, c1). In the simulated world, the response c is defined as m+y
(if j = 1) or m+ z (if j = 3), where (y, z) = R(k1,m1, w). Clearly, if the distinguisher has
queried R(k1,m1, w) before, it knows the response in advance. Otherwise, it is randomly
drawn from {0, 1}n by construction. Regarding the real world, the same reasoning applies:
either the query is new, or it must have appeared as a bottom query (left if j = 1, right if
j = 3) of an earlier F 3A evaluation (by ¬cond(LE)), in which case the distinguisher knows
the response.
R−1-query (k, c). In the simulated world, queries are always answered with a random answer
from {0, 1}n. In the real world, this is also the case, except if a certain query (k,m) with
LE+[k](m) = c has ever been triggered via a call to F 3A. However, in this case, the response
will still appear completely random to the distinguisher, similar to the first item of forward
queries to R. uunionsq
Lemma 2. Pr
(
cond(LE) for (F 3A, E˜)
)
≤ 3(3qL+qR)22n and Pr
(
cond(LE) for (R, S˜)
)
≤ 3q2R2n .
Proof. We start with the real world (F 3A, E˜). At the end of the proof, we highlight the differences
that give rise to the bound for the simulated world (R, S˜).
Let 1 ≤ i ≤ 3qL + qR, and denote by LEi the set LE after the ith query. We assume
¬cond(LEi−1) and consider the probability cond(LEi) gets satisfied. More detailed, we consider
the probability that the ith query makes the condition satisfied for some j, j′ ∈ {1, 3} and some
earlier query (k′,m′, c′) ∈ LE. Note that cond(LEi) can only be triggered by the values derived
in lines 11 and 21. In fact, these values are always randomly generated from {0, 1}n.
Decomposing cond(LEi), the ith query satisfies the condition if it satisfies any of the
following three:
aj ·(k,m, c) = k for j ∈ {1, 3} ,
aj ·(k,m, c) = k′ for j ∈ {1, 3} and (k′,m′, c′) ∈ LEi−1 ,
aj ·(k,m, c) = aj′ ·(k′,m′, c′) for j, j′ ∈ {1, 3} and (k′,m′, c′) ∈ LEi−1 .
Therefore, cond(LEi) gets satisfied with probability at most 6(i−1)+22n (as a12, a13, a32, a33 6= 0).
We thus find:
Pr (cond(LE)) ≤
3qL+qR∑
i=1
Pr (cond(LEi) | ¬cond(LEi−1))
≤
3qL+qR∑
i=1
6(i− 1) + 2
2n
≤ 3(3qL + qR)
2
2n
.
Now, for the simulated world, first note that 1 ≤ i ≤ qR. In this setting, cond(LEi) can
only be triggered by the values derived in lines 41, 45, and 51. We remark that in line 45, the
value c is indeed always a random n-bit value by ¬cond(LEi−1). uunionsq
8 MDC-4
For MDC-4, we leave out the swapping at the end as it is of no influence to the indifferentiability
proof. The function is given in Fig. 5. Here, for a bit string x, we write xl and xr to denote
its left and right halves where |xl| = |xr|. MDC-4 achieves a higher level of indifferentiability
security than MDC-2, mainly due to the two sequential rounds. Differentiability is discussed
in Sect. 8.1, and indifferentiability in Sect. 8.2.
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u v
w
c1 c2
k3 k4
y z
E1 E2
E2 E1
MDC-4(u, v, w) = (y, z), where:
c1 ← E1(u,w) ,
c2 ← E2(v, w) ,
k3 ← cl2‖cr1 + w ,
y ← E2(k3, u) + u ,
k4 ← cl1‖cr2 + w ,
z ← E1(k4, v) + v .
Fig. 5. The MDC-4 compression function. For convenience, the swapping at the end is omitted.
8.1 Differentiability
In Prop. 6 we show that MDC-4 is differentiable from a random oracle in at most about 2n/4
queries. The attack is very similar to the attack of Prop. 5, but is included for convenience.
We briefly note that if E1 = E2, MDC-4 is clearly differentiable in 2 queries, exploiting that
MDC-4(u, u, w) has the same left and right half for any u,w ∈ {0, 1}n.
Proposition 6. Let E1, E2
$← Bloc(n), and let R : {0, 1}3n → {0, 1}2n be a random com-
pression function. For any simulator S that makes at most qS queries to R, there exists a
distinguisher D that makes 2n/4 + 2 queries to its oracles, such that
adviffMDC-4,S(D) ≥
1
2
− 1
2n/4+1
− qS + 1
2n − qS .
Proof. Our distinguisher D aims at finding two different evaluations of MDC-4 with the same
key inputs to the bottom left block cipher call. In more detail, the distinguisher fixes u and w
and aims at finding two distinct block cipher calls (v, w, c2) and (v
′, w, c′2) such that:
cl2 = c
′
2
l
. (9)
Note that in the real world, for MDC-4, such collisions are expected to be found in about
2n/4 queries to E. If the distinguisher eventually finds a collision as in (9), then the following
condition naturally holds in the real world:
y := MDC-4(u, v, w)l = MDC-4(u, v′, w)l =: y′ . (10)
In the random world, with MDC-4 replaced by R, this equation only holds with small prob-
ability. Note that the simulator never learns the value u, yet, it may simply try to avoid
collisions as in (9). However, in this case, the responses from S are too biased, which allows
the distinguisher to succeed.
Formally, the distinguisher D proceeds as follows.
(i) D makes 2n/4 queries to its right oracle R for different key values and for a fixed message
value w, obtaining 2n/4 distinct tuples (v, w, c2);
(ii) If there is no solution to (9), D returns 1;
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(iii) Let (v, w, c2) and (v
′, w, c′2) be such that (9) is satisfied;
(iv) Take u
$← {0, 1}n. If (10) holds, D returns 0, and otherwise it returns 1.
Distinguisher D succeeds except in the following two cases: “C1” it is conversing with the real
world and (9) does not have a solution (which means that his guess in step (ii) is wrong), or
“C2” it is conversing with the simulated world and (10) holds (which means that his guess in
step (iv) is wrong). Therefore, adviffMDC-4,S(D) ≥ 1 − Pr (C1) − Pr (C2). Regarding C1: note
that all queries are made with different key inputs, and E2 is a random cipher. Therefore, all
responses are randomly drawn from a set of size 2n, and a collision (4) occurs with probability
at least
(
2n/4
2
)
2n/2
2n . Thus,
Pr (C1) ≤ 1−
(
2n/4
2
)
2n/2
2n
=
1
2
+
1
2n/4+1
.
Regarding C2, the proof of Prop. 5 carries over and we find Pr (C2) ≤ qS+12n−qS . This completes
the proof. uunionsq
8.2 Indifferentiability
We prove that MDC-4 is indifferentiable from a random function.
Theorem 2. Let E1, E2
$← Bloc(n), and let R : {0, 1}3n → {0, 1}2n be a random function.
There exists a simulator S such that for any distinguisher D that makes at most qL left queries
and qR right queries,
adviffMDC-4,S(D) ≤
6(4qL + qR)
2
2n/2
,
where S makes qS ≤ qR queries to R.
For ease of presentation, the proof is given in App. A. It is truly similar to the proof of Thm. 1.
9 Conclusions
Being the only known double length compression function that achieves optimal collision secu-
rity and a non-trivial indifferentiability bound, Mennink’s compression function class appears
to be stronger than its alternatives. Yet, this additional level of security does not come for free:
the function makes three block cipher calls, rather than “the usual” two, which are moreover
not parallelizable. It would be of both theoretical and practical interest to derive a two-call
compression function (for either choice of k) with the same or even better security guarantees.6
We note, however, that the indifferentiability proof in this work relies on the presence of the
third block cipher call, and all attacks on functions with k = 2n rely on the fact that these
make only two primitive calls.
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A Indifferentiability of MDC-4
In this appendix, we prove Thm. 2. The proof is similar to the proof of Thm. 1: it differs in
various aspects and therefore deserves a separate proof, but we skip the redundant details. In
the remainder of the section, we first introduce our simulator and accommodate it with an
intuition, and next present the formal proof.
Simulator Intuition
Similar to Sect. 7.2, the simulator maintains an initially empty lists LE1[k] (corresponding
to E1) and LE2[k] (corresponding to E2) for k ∈ {0, 1}n. Abusing notation, we also write
LE = LE1 ∪ LE2. The simulator is given in Fig. 6. It consists of four interfaces: S1/S−11
corresponding to E1/E
−1
1 , and S2/S−12 corresponding to E2/E−12 .
Again, apart from the if -clause of lines 02-06, the simulator identically mimics an ideal
cipher. In this particular clause, the simulator checks whether a query (k,m) may appear in
an MDC-4 evaluation (see Fig. 5) as a bottom query (left or right) for some other pair of
queries appearing in the top. In this case, the simulator should consult R to derive the query
response.
Forward Query Sj(k,m) (j ∈ {1, 2})
00 if LE+j [k](m) 6= ⊥ return c = LE+j [k](m)
01 c
$← {0, 1}n\LE+j [k]
02 if ∃ (u,w, c1) ∈ LE1, (v, w, c2) ∈ LE2 : . . .
03 . . . m = u[j = 2] + v[j = 1] and k = clj‖crj¯ + w
04 (y, z)←R(u, v, w)
05 c← m + (y[j = 2] + z[j = 1])
06 end if
07 return LE+j [k](m)← c
Inverse Query S−1j (k, c) (j ∈ {1, 2})
10 if LE−j [k](c) 6= ⊥ return m = LE−j [k](c)
11 m
$← {0, 1}n\LE−j [k]
12 return LE−j [k](c)← m
Fig. 6. The simulator S for E used in the proof of Thm. 2. Here, j¯ ∈ {1, 2} is the complement
of j ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof of Theorem 2
We formally proof Thm. 2. The proof is similar to the proof of Thm. 1, with only minor
modifications. Let S be the simulator of Fig. 6, and let D be any distinguisher that makes at
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most qL left queries and qR right queries. Note that S makes qS ≤ qR queries. By Def. 1, the
goal is to bound:
adviffMDC-4,S(D) =
∣∣Pr (DMDC-4,E = 1)−Pr (DR,S = 1)∣∣ . (11)
As in Sect. 7.2, we first perform a PRP-PRF switch. E˜ and S˜ are defined similarly as before,
and we obtain for (11):
adviffMDC-4,S(D) ≤
∣∣∣Pr(DMDC-4,E˜ = 1)−Pr(DR,S˜ = 1)∣∣∣+ 2(4qL + qR)2
2n
. (12)
It remains to analyze the probability of D to distinguish (MDC-4, E˜) (real world) from (R, S˜)
(simulated world). These worlds are described in Fig. 7. The notations LE1, LE2 and LR are
defined similarly as before.
Let event cond(LE) be defined as follows:
cond(LE) =
 ∃ j ∈ {l, r}, (k,m, c), (k
′,m′, c′) ∈ LE :
(k,m, c) newer than (k′,m′, c′) and
(c+m)j ∈ {kj , k′j , (c′ +m′)j}
 . (13)
Event cond(LE) is fairly the same as the event for the proof in Sect. 7.2 (equation (8)).
Therefore, we skip the detailed explanation, and just point out that as long as ¬cond(LE),
the condition in line 42 of Fig. 7 is always satisfied by at most one ((u,w, c1), (v, w, c2)). In
the remainder, we prove in Lem. 3 that (MDC-4, E˜) and (R, S˜) are perfectly indistinguishable
as long as cond(LE) does not occur in both worlds. Then, in Lem. 4 we prove that cond(LE)
occurs in the real world with probability at most 2(4qL+qR)
2
2n/2
and in the simulated world with
probability at most
2q2R
2n/2
. Together with (12), this completes the proof.
Query MDC-4(u, v, w)
00 c1 ← E˜1(u,w)
01 c2 ← E˜2(v, w)
02 k3 ← cl2‖cr1 + w
03 y ← E˜2(k3, u) + u
04 k4 ← cl1‖cr2 + w
05 z ← E˜1(k4, v) + v
06 return (y, z)
Query E˜j(k,m) (j ∈ {1, 2})
10 if LE+j [k](m) 6= ⊥ return c = LE+j [k](m)
11 c
$← {0, 1}n
12 return LE+j [k](m)← c
Query E˜−1j (k, c) (j ∈ {1, 2})
20 if LE−j [k](c) 6= ⊥ return m = LE−j [k](c)
21 m
$← {0, 1}n
22 return LE−j [k](c)← m
Query R(u, v, w)
30 if LR(u, v, w) 6= ⊥ return (y, z) = LR(u, v, w)
31 (y, z)
$← {0, 1}2n
32 return LR(u, v, w)← (y, z)
Query S˜j(k,m) (j ∈ {1, 2})
40 if LE+j [k](m) 6= ⊥ return c = LE+j [k](m)
41 c
$← {0, 1}n
42 if ∃ (u,w, c1) ∈ LE1, (v, w, c2) ∈ LE2 : . . .
43 . . . m = u[j = 2] + v[j = 1] and k = clj‖crj¯ + w
44 (y, z)←R(u, v, w)
45 c← m + (y[j = 2] + z[j = 1])
46 end if
47 return LE+j [k](m)← c
Query S˜−1j (k, c) (j ∈ {1, 2})
50 if LE−j [k](c) 6= ⊥ return m = LE−j [k](c)
51 m
$← {0, 1}n
52 return LE−j [k](c)← m
Fig. 7. The worlds (MDC-4, E˜) (left) and (R, S˜) (right).
Lemma 3. As long as ¬cond(LE), (MDC-4, E˜) from (R, S˜) are perfectly indistinguishable.
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Proof. We consider any query made by the distinguisher, either to the left oracle L (either
MDC-4 or R) and the right oracle R/R−1 (either E˜/E˜−1 or S˜/S˜−1), and show that the query
responses are equally distributed in both worlds (irrespectively of the query history). Without
loss of generality, we consider new queries only: if the distinguisher makes a repetitive query,
the answer is known and identically distributed in both worlds.
L-query (u, v, w). We make the following distinction:
1. LE+1 [u](w) = ⊥ and/or LE+2 [v](w) = ⊥. In the real world, this means that the first
cipher call E˜1(u,w) or the second call E˜2(v, w) is new, and answered with a fresh value.
As cond(LE) does not occur, also the third and fourth call, E˜2(k3, u) and E˜1(k4, v), are
fresh, and both their responses are drawn from {0, 1}n. Regarding the simulated world, by
the condition “LE+1 [u](w) = ⊥ or LE+2 [v](w) = ⊥,” S˜ has never queried R on input of
(u, v, w). Indeed, it had only queried R if the condition of line 42 was satisfied for some
existing (u,w, c1) ∈ LE1 and (v, w, c2) ∈ LE2. Thus, also in this world the response is
randomly generated from {0, 1}2n;
2. LE+1 [u](w) 6= ⊥ and LE+2 [v](w) 6= ⊥. Note that in the real world, these elements could
have been added to LE via D or via MDC-4. Let c1 = LE+1 [u](w) and c2 = LE+2 [v](w),
and write k3 = c
l
2‖cr1 + w and k4 = cl1‖cr2 + w. We make the following distinction:
• LE+2 [k3](u) = ⊥ and LE+1 [k4](v) = ⊥. In the real world, the answers to the queries
E˜2(k3, u) and E˜1(k4, v) are both fresh and randomly drawn from {0, 1}n. Regarding
the simulated world, by contradiction we prove that R(u, v, w) has never been queried
before by S˜. Indeed, suppose it has been queried before. This necessarily means that
there exist (u,w, c1) ∈ LE1 and (v, w, c2) ∈ LE2 such that clj‖crj¯ + w = k′ and u[j =
2]+v[j = 1] = m′ for some (k′,m′, c′) ∈ LEj . The former implies k′ = k3[j = 2]+k4[j =
1]. This contradicts the condition that (k3, u) is not in LE2 and (k4, v) not in LE1.
Therefore, the query (u, v, w) to R is new, and the response is randomly drawn from
{0, 1}2n;
• LE+2 [k3](u) 6= ⊥ and/or LE+1 [k4](v) 6= ⊥. Without loss of generality, assume the former
and write c3 = LE+2 [k3](u). In the real world, this query could not have been made in
an earlier evaluation of MDC-4 (by virtue of cond(LE)). Therefore, the distinguisher
must have made this query, and particular knows y = c3 + u, which is the left half of
the query response. In the simulated world, a similar story applies: by ¬cond(LE), this
query to S˜ must have been made after (u,w, c1) and (v, w, c2), and thus, the response
value c3 equals u+ y by line 45, where y equals the left half of R(u, v, w). Thus also in
this case, the distinguisher knows the left half of the query response.
If also LE+1 [k4](v) 6= ⊥, the same reasoning applies to z, the second half of the query
response. On the other hand, in case LE+1 [k4](v) = ⊥, the previous bullet carries over
to the z-part.
Rj-query (k,m) (j ∈ {1, 2}). We make the following distinction:
1. ¬ ∃ (u,w, c1) ∈ LE1, (v, w, c2) ∈ LE2 : m = u[j = 2] + v[j = 1] and k = clj‖crj¯ + w.
In the simulated world, the response is randomly drawn from {0, 1}n by construction.
Regarding the real world, first assume (k,m) has never been queried to E˜j via a query to
MDC-4. Then, the response is clearly fresh and randomly drawn from {0, 1}n. However,
it may be the case that the E˜j-query could have been triggered by an earlier MDC-4-
query. However, by the condition, it could have impossibly appeared in such evaluation as
a bottom left/right query. It may have appeared as a top left/right query in an MDC-4
evaluation, which means that (k, v,m) has been queried to MDC-4 for some v (if j = 1) or
(u, k,m) for some u (if j = 2). However, in this setting, the adversary never learnt c, and
thus the response to the R-query appears completely randomly drawn from {0, 1}n;
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2. ∃ (u,w, c1) ∈ LE1, (v, w, c2) ∈ LE2 : m = u[j = 2] + v[j = 1] and k = clj‖crj¯ + w. By
¬cond(LE), these values are unique. In the simulated world, the response c is defined as
m+ y (if j = 2) or m+ z (if j = 1), where (y, z) = R(u, v, w). Clearly, if the distinguisher
has queried R(u, v, w) before, it knows the response in advance. Otherwise, it is randomly
drawn from {0, 1}n by construction. Regarding the real world, the same reasoning applies:
either the query is new, or it must have appeared as a bottom query (left if j = 2, right
if j = 1) of an earlier MDC-4 evaluation (by ¬cond(LE)), in which case the distinguisher
knows the response.
R−1j -query (k, c) (j ∈ {1, 2}). In the simulated world, queries are always answered with a
random answer from {0, 1}n. In the real world, this is also the case, except if a certain query
(k,m) with LE+[k](m) = c has ever been triggered via a call to MDC-4. However, in this case,
the response will still appear completely random to the distinguisher, similar to the first item
of forward queries to Rj . uunionsq
Lemma 4. Pr
(
cond(LE) for (MDC-4, E˜)
)
≤ 2(4qL+qR)2
2n/2
and Pr
(
cond(LE) for (R, S˜)
)
≤
2q2R
2n/2
.
Proof. The proof is the same as the proof of Lem. 2, with the differences that cond(LEi) gets
satisfied with probability at most 4(i−1)+2
2n/2
and that for the real world (MDC-4, E˜) i ranges
from 1 to 4qL + qR. uunionsq
19
